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COMMENTS
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY AND THE TITLE SEARCH
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in Fries v. Clearview
Gardens Sixth Corp.' has once again affirmed a principle of law which has met
with little or no adversity from the bench of this state for over eighty years.2
The principle tersely stated is that a grantor or mortgagor of an after-acquired
property interest is estopped from claiming the invalidity of the conveyance
when once he acquires the interest, and such estoppel runs to all his privies of
estate, blood or law.3 For the purposes of this comment the term, after-acquired
property, relates to property which has been conveyed or mortgaged by one who
has no title to the property but who subsequent to the purported conveyance
acquires title.
In Fries v. Clearview Gardens Sixth Corp. the Flushing Terrace Corporation
was seized and was record owner of real estate in North Flushing, New York on
May 9, 1929. On January 16, 1933 the corporation conveyed a parcel of the
realty, including the premises which are the subject of the suit, to one Brickner.
On February 2, 1934 said corporation, when it was not seized of the property,
conveyed the specific property in question by full covenant and warranty deed
to the plaintiffs. On June 29, 1934 Brickner re-conveyed to the corporation the
entire property conveyed to him in 1933. On the same day that the property was
re-conveyed to it the corporation conveyed the property to a third party and by
a series of mesne conveyances defendants obtained title. The suit, among other
things, was to determine the owner of the fee of the premises specifically con-
tained in the deed from the corporation to plaintiffs in 1934. All of the afore-
mentioned deeds were duly and properly recorded. The Appellate Division found
in favor of the plaintiffs relying heavily on the principle previously stated. 4
Since the court found as a matter of fact that the defendants had actual notice
of the conveyance to plaintiffs, this analysis of the principle can find no fault
with the decision.. In relation to this finding of actual notice, it is essential to
point out at this time that all of the conveyances were recorded in what is known
as a "lot and block system." The importance of this factor will soon be explained.
The court cited as one of its chief authorities the case of Teift v. Munson.0
This case more vividly enunciates the principle which will be the object of the
adverse criticism contained in this article. The facts are brief: On March 7,
1848, Gamiel Perkins was seized and was record owner of property in Washington
County, New York. Immediately after acquiring the premises, said Perkins let
his son Martin into possession. Martin thereupon forged a deed from his father,
and recorded it on May 27, 1850. Subsequently he mortgaged the premises to
1. 285 App. Div. 568, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 573 (2d Dep't 1955).
2. See 58 A.L.R. 353 (1929) cases cited therein commencing with Tefft v. Munson, 57
N.Y. 97 (1874).
3. Tefit v. Munson, 57 N.Y. 97 (1874); Annot., 1918B L.RA. 776 n. 185.
4. Tefft v. Munson, 57 N.Y. 97 (1874); Oliphant v. Burns, 146 N.Y. 218, 40 N.E. 980,
(1895) ; House v. McCormick, 57 N.Y. 310 (1874).
5. 57 N.Y. 97 (1874).
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defendants with covenants of seisin and warranty and this mortgage was recorded
on October 1, 1850. Martin thereafter purported to convey the property back
to his father and recorded the deed on January 23, 1860. On January 14, 1860
a legitimate deed for the premises from Gamiel to Martin was recorded. On
January 31, 1867 plaintiff acquired title from Martin and recorded his deed on
February 9th of that year. Plaintiff sought to restrain defendants from fore-
closing said mortgage, but the court denied relief, holding that although the
forged deed could be considered a nullity and constructive notice to no one,
plaintiff being privy in estate to Martin Perkins was estopped from claiming the
invalidity of the mortgage, and could not avail himself of the protection of the
recording act. It seems indicative and noteworthy that this leading case was
decided by a divided court (three to two) and that the short but precise dissent
seized upon the glaring practical difficulty posed by the majority's decision'
To appreciate the practical problem presented by the decision, it is first neces-
sary to have at least a general concept of the scheme and manner of conducting
a title search to real property. In New York today two chief systems are utilized.
In most of the larger metropolitan areas a system known as "lot and block" is
available, while in the more numerous suburban areas the "grantor-grantee" or
"alphabetized" indices must be resorted to.7
Thus when searching in a county where the "lot and block" system is utilized,
the procedure is relatively simple. In these counties all of the real estate is
divided into geographical units, usually city blocks. Each block is numbered-
and frequently its subdivision of lots also numbered-and said block allotted a
page or pages in an index book for deeds and similarly so in an index book for
mortgages. By turning to the proper page in the index book one may find all
of the conveyances affecting the property being searched. Thus if one were
searching lot 1, block 1 in "X" County, he would first turn to the index book
containing deeds or conveyances; turning to the page headed Block 1, the
searcher would find listed each deed affecting property contained in Block 1.
Upon close scrutiny the searcher would discover each deed that had affected his
premises, and would subsequently examine each instrument so affecting for the
period of his search.8 These instruments (photostats or copies of them) are kept
in libers numbered chronologically. The indices tell the liber and page where the
instrument will be found. An exactly similar procedure would be followed in
regard to mortgages. Thus if the search were to cover a sixty year period the
6. Reynolds, C., dissenting stated: "fIn the very best aspect of defendant's care, the record
of the mortgage was made out of the order required by law, and failed to give notice to
anybody dealing with the title to the land... .In this view, the deed of the plaintiff was
first recorded, and he is entitled to protection in his title." Id. at 103.
7. See North & Van Buren, Real Estate Titles and Conveyancing 128-30 (1st ed. 1927);
Flick, Abstract and Title Practice 4-5 (1st ed. 1951).
8. The period of the title search often varies, depending on the facts of the case; the
length of time in continued possession and other elements of adverse possession might con-
vince a prospective purchaser that a title search of fifteen years was sufficient. Most title
insurance companies and mortgage corporations require at least a thirty year search of the
records and many require a sixty year search. Only infrequently is it required to search a
title to its source.
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specific page or pages of said indices would reveal each instrument recorded
between 1895 and 1955. Upon examination of these instruments the searcher
can readily ascertain the precise and present recorded status of the premises in
question. This is an excellent and rapid means of title search.
The second and more prevalent method is the "grantor-grantee" system. Here
is where we find only the highly trained and qualified technician entrusted with
the title search.9 The first step in this procedure is to ascertain the present record
owner of the premises for which a search is required. Once knowing this name
the searcher goes to a system of indices called "grantee." In these ledgers each
deed is recorded according to an alphabetized system and each instrument is
placed in chronological order according to its date of recording. So assuming
that the present record owner is John C. Smith, the searcher would turn to that
ledger wherein is contained those grantees named Smith; thence he would seek
a grantee John C. Smith and ascertain each deed wherein John C. Smith was a
grantee. Then he would examine each instrument itself until he discovered the
premises in question granted to John C. Smith. Upon discovering that deed,
Smith's grantor would be revealed and the searcher would then proceed with
said grantor from the date of said deed in the same manner as he had proceeded
with Smith. This process would continue until the desired chain of title had been
obtained.10 Of course in the interim many problems could arise but the purpose
here is only to give the reader a general idea of the system and not the many
refinements of its mechanics."1
When once the chain of title has been obtained and each deed carefully
abstracted, the searcher's chore is only half complete. The next and more diffi-
cult task is to complete what is known as the "adverse work." The searcher
must take each person in his chain of title, and during his period of seizure1 2
run him through a system of indices known as "mortgagor" and "grantor."
These indices, as their names indicate, reveal each grantor or mortgagor of
property in the county. So assuming that our present record owner, Smith,
obtained title by a deed dated November 1, 1948, it would be necessary to run
him from that date in each of these indices. This would reveal if said Smith
had made any deeds or mortgages. If such should be revealed the searcher
would examine each instrument to see if it affected the premises in question.
Perhaps now the problem which confronts the title searcher begins to make
itself apparent to the reader. The court by its declaration in the cases previously
discussed has bound the purchaser of property with any deed or mortgage made
9. See North & Van Buren, op. cit. supra note 7, at 224-25.
10. See note 8 supra.
11. For a comprehensive treatment of title searching with its many allied subjects, see
North & Van Buren, op. cit. supra note 7; Flick, op. cit. supra note 7; 2 Weed, Practical
Real Estate Law (1st ed. 1920).
12. See North & Van Buren, op. cit. supra note 7, at 143; Maupin, Marketable Title to
Real Estate (2d ed. 1907) ; 2 Weed, op. cit. supra note 11, at 77. Whether the owners in
the chain of title need be searched as to the adverse work only for the period between the
date of the deed into him until the recordation of the deed out of him is the precise question
presented by this comment. The above authorities state emphatically that the searcher Is
responsible only for examining instruments recorded during this period.
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by a person prior in title, regardless of whether or not said person had title or
was to later acquire it. Exactly what does this mean to the title searcher?
To one fortunate enough to have available for his perusal a lot and block
system no difficulty is encountered since he has before him every conveyance,
deed or mortgage which has affected the property being searched. Although
he discovers that the mortgagor or grantor was not in title at the time of the
indenture, he is aware of the principle advocated in Tefft v. Munson and thus
so reports his title.
But what of the title searcher in the more rural areas with his antiquated, if
not classical, means of searching. Applying the aforesaid principle to his en-
deavors, he must in his "adverse work" take each record owner and run him
from the date of his birth until he departs from title in the mortgagor and
grantor indices in order to ascertain if such individual executed any indentures
of mortgage or deed. This presents an impossible, if not ludicrous, situation.
For example "X" Corporation acquires Blackacre in 1954 and has now contracted
for its sale. "X" Corporation was incorporated in 1900 and has developed some
fifty tracts in "Z" County. "X" Corporation has executed and there has been
recorded since its incorporation 3,000 deeds. It would then be necessary for the
title searcher to examine each of these instruments as well as any mortgages
recorded from 1900 in order to satisfy himself that said corporation had not
previously conveyed or mortgaged Blackacre which it did not acquire until 1954.
The procedure would have to be followed with each owner in the chain of title.
The strict application of this principle would make title searching impossible
and the cost prohibitive. The fee for a title search in New York today bears
mute witness that the principle is being ignored.13
Although the purpose of this comment is not specifically to find fault with the
legal or equitable reasoning of this court, but rather the impractical situation
its application involves, mention might be made of the somewhat paradoxical
principles propounded by the court. If "A" conveys property which he does not
own by warranty deed to "B" who records and subsequently "A" becomes seized
and conveys to "C" who records, "B" prevails in a suit to establish the owner
of the property.' 4 However if "A" who is seized and record owner conveys to
"B" who does not record and then "A" again conveys the premises to "C" who
does record, "C" prevails in a similar suit.'5 Admittedly the two cases are not
squarely in conflict, but it seems apparent that the first does not fulfill the intent
of the recording act.' 6 The exact purpose of the act was to permit the purchase
of realty with some degree of assurance as to the quality of the title and, as has
been shown, the application of the principle makes a proper search prohibitive
and casts the prospective purchaser back to the status in which he suffered prior
to the recording act. This is an unrealistic situation and one of which the courts
or legislature should take cognizance.
13. See note 12 supra.
14. See note 2 supra.
15. N.Y. Real Property Law § 291 (1944).
16. In McCusker v. McEvey, 9 RI. 528 (1870), the court, although advocating the
principle of Tefft v. Munson, admits that it may be at variance with the spirit of the
recording act.
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Outside of New York there is sharp conflict and dispute as to this principle.
There is practical unanimity as to estoppel against the grantor or mortgagor him-
self of after acquired property from later claiming its invalidity. But as to the
recording of such instrument serving as constructive notice to an otherwise bona
fide purchaser for value without notice there is sharp controversy. 17
The cases typified by Teift v. Munson either find no conflict with the recording
act or else arbitrarily dismiss it as subservient to the principle propounded. 18
The opposing line of cases take the view that the recording laws prevent the
after acquired title from inuring to the benefit of a grantee who took a convey-
ance from one who had no title to the property, and who recorded such title
before the grantor acquired title.19 A Connecticut court so precisely seized upon
the problem that it would seem most informative to quote from its decision in
Wheeler v. Young 20 at length. The court maintains that to carry the doctrine
that an after-acquired title inures to the benefit of a prior grantee to the extent
of giving priority to the title of one who from his negligent failure to examine the
records has been induced to purchase land of a person having no title over that
of one who without negligence, in good faith, and for value and without knowl-
edge of such prior deed, has purchased after his grantor has acquired title from
one having both legal and record title is opposed to the principles of equity and
to the theory of the registry laws. Further, the court said: "It may be said that
such estoppel by deed is not any equitable doctrine, but is a rule of the common
law, based upon the recitals or covenants of the deed. We reply that as a rule
of law it has been so far modified by the registry laws as to be no longer appli-
cable to cases where its enforcement would work such an injustice as to give
priority to the title of one who negligently failed to examine the records before
purchasing of a grantor having no title, or who purchased at the risk that his
grantor might thereafter acquire title, over that of a subsequent purchaser in
good faith, and in reliance upon the title as it appeared of record."2 1
It is regrettable that the New York court has so tenaciously clung to a principle
first firmly advocated in 1874. The principle was no more sound at that date
than it is now, but the ever increasing real estate negotiations since that date
have so multiplied and the recording of deeds, mortgages and other instruments
have become so myriad in proportion that this archaic principle has lost all
semblance of practicality. A rule of law which with the passing of time has be-
come so unworkable that to a great extent it is being ignored by the people
intimately concerned 2 should be closely scrutinized and re-examined by a court
that wishes to face and remain abreast of the currents of an ever-changing world.
Today in New York a purchaser of realty in assuming title runs a calculated
risk that his title will not be subsequently defeated by a mortgagee or grantee
of an owner prior in the chain of title who executed such indenture prior to his
acquisition of title. It seems most peculiar that New York's large title insurance
17. 58 A.L.R. 350 (1929) ; 41 C.J. 479 (1926) ; 25 A.L.R. 83-95 (1923).
18. 25 A.L.R. 86-89 (1923).
19. 25 A.L.R. 91-92 (1923).
20. 76 Conn. 44, 55 AtI. 670 (1903).
21. Id. at 48, 55 AtI. at 672.
22. See note 12 supra.
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